The Bank, the Bond and the Bail-Out: On the Legal Construction of Market Discipline in the Eurozone by Schepel, Harm
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Schepel, Harm  (2017) The Bank, the Bond and the Bail-Out: On the Legal Construction of Market
Discipline in the Eurozone.   Journal of Law and Society, 44  (1).   pp. 79-98.  ISSN 0263-323X.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12015















indispensable	 complement-	 or	 alternative-	 to	 the	 legal	 mechanisms	 in	 the	 Treaty	 and	




and	 125	 TFEU,	 prohibiting	 monetary	 financing	 of	 national	 debt	 by	 the	 European	 Central	
Bank	 and	 national	 central	 banks,	 and	 the	 assumption	 of	 liability	 for	 the	 debts	 of	 any	
Member	 State	 by	 other	 Member	 States	 and	 the	 Union.	 In	 one	 of	 its	 least	 contested	
observations	in	Pringle,	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	held	that	the	purpose	of	
these	‘no	bail-out’	clauses	 is	to	ensure	that	Member	States	 ‘remain	subject	to	the	 logic	of	





1 	Wolfgang	 Schäuble,	 A	 Comprehensive	 Strategy	 for	 the	 Stabilization	 of	 the	 Economic	 and	







	Accordingly,	 the	 ‘logic	 of	 the	market’	 is	 the	 standard	 of	 legality	 of	
financial	 assistance	 to	 indebted	 Member	 States	 under	 EU	 Law	 and,	 ultimately,	 the	 legal	
justification	for	strict	conditionality	and	the	imposition	of	austerity.	This	logic	of	the	market,	
though,	 is	something	different	from	actual	market	behavior.	This	was	necessarily	so	in	the	
two	 grand	 Euro-crisis	 judgments	 of	 the	 Court.	 The	 European	 Stability	 Mechanism	 gives	
assistance	only	to	Member	States	who	have	lost	access	to	markets	in	the	first	place,	leaving	
the	Court	in	Pringle	with	the	task	of	deciding	whether	the	conditions	the	ESM	imposed	on	
beneficiaries	 prompted	 budgetary	 discipline	 according	 to	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 market.	 The	
Outright	Monetary	Transactions	of	the	ECB	were	explicitly	meant	to	correct	the	‘excessive’	
interest	rates	charged	of	indebted	Member	States	in	the	sovereign	debt	market,	leaving	the	



























Witte,	 ‘Euro	 crisis	 responses	 and	 the	 EU	 legal	 order:	 increased	 institutional	 variation	 or	
constitutional	mutation?’,	European	Constitutional	L	Rev	 (11):	434-457;	M.	 Ioannidis,	 ‘Europe’s	
instead,	on	 the	way	 the	Court	 constructs	 ‘market	discipline’	 in	 its	 very	absence	as	a	 legal	
requirement.	 It	 is	 a	 case	 of	 obscene	 politics	masquerading	 as	 bad	 economics	making	 for	






policy,	 the	 higher	 the	debt,	 and	 the	 greater	 the	 risk	 of	 default.	 	 The	higher	 that	 risk,	 the	
costlier	borrowing	becomes,	and	the	more	expensive	the	debt.	The	only	way	for	States	to	
get	out	of	this	vicious	cycle	is	to	pursue	‘sound’	budgetary	policies,	lower	the	debt,	and	be	
rewarded	 with	 lower	 interest	 rates.	 For	 this	 virtuous	 mechanism	 of	 market	 discipline	 to	






only	 be	 avoided	 if	 disaster	 is	 a	 credible	 prospect.	 This	 price	 formation	 takes	 place	 on	
secondary	 markets:	 bonds	 from	 sovereigns	 considered	 under	 risk	 will	 get	 sold	 at	 lower	
prices	 than	 their	 nominal	 value.	 Since	 the	 interest	 on	 these	 cut-price	 bonds	 remains	 the	
same,	the	return-on-investment,	the	yield,	goes	up.	To	be	able	to	attract	investors	for	new	
bonds,	States	will	naturally	have	to	offer	 interest	rates	that	match	the	yield.	Table	1	plots	














of	 what	 the	 market	 was	 supposed	 to	 do.	 Convergence	 of	 yields	 started	 before	 the	





was	 nearly	 identical	 to	 that	 of	 Germany.
	
Whatever	 else	 the	 markets	 may	 have	 been	




If	 the	markets	 were	 creating	moral	 hazard	 among	 debtor	 States,	 one	 of	 the	 causes	 was	
clearly	 the	moral	 hazard	 created	 among	 creditors	 by	 European	 banking	 regulation.	 Banks	
operate	under	capital	requirements	limiting	their	leverage	and	exposure.	The	capital	ratio	is	
expressed	 as	 a	 percentage	of	 the	 regulatory	 capital	 banks	 are	 to	 hold	 in	 relation	 to	 their	
lending	 and	 investment.	 That	 lending	 and	 investment,	 in	 turn,	 is	 ‘risk-weighted,’	 forcing	
banks	to	have	higher	capital	ratios	for	 ‘riskier’	assets.	Exposure	limits	seek	to	diversify	risk	
by	limiting	the	proportion	of	 lending	and	investment	to	particular	assets.	These	regulatory	
requirements	 have	 proven	 spectacularly	 ineffective,	 of	 course,	 with	 banks	 and	 other	







Political	 Economy	 (2015),	 20:	 752-782	 (finding	 that	 membership	 of	 EMU	 reduces	 market	
punishment	but	increases	policymakers’	responsiveness).	







Regulating	 risk	 away	 from	 sovereign	 debt	 seems	 a	 strange	 way	 to	 ensure	 that	 markets	
correctly	 price	 risk.	 And	 yet,	 perversely,	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 regulatory	 treatment	of	
sovereign	debt	seems	to	have	been	to	render	markets	more,	not	less,	attuned	to	the	risk	of	
insolvency	 of	Member	 States.	One	of	 the	 factors	 polluting	 price	 formation,	 so	 the	 theory	
goes,	is	‘liquidity	risk’:	if	investors	fear	that	they	will	not	be	able	to	re-sell	their	bonds,	their	
appetite	 for	 sovereign	bonds	will	 go	down	and	 the	 cost	of	debt	will	 go	up.	 	 The	 zero-risk	
weighting,	by	increasing	demand	for	sovereign	debt,	will	increase	liquidity	and	hence	‘free’	







of	 periphery	 debt	 for	 it	 still	 to	 be	 worthwhile,	 thus	 increasing	 demand	 further,	 and	
decreasing	 the	 yield	 further	 still	 until	 the	 spread	 is	 all	 but	 gone.	 At	 this	 point	 banks	 find	
themselves	with	enormous	leveraged	exposure	to	sovereigns	whose	budgetary	policies	are	

















fail’	will,	 however,	 become	 ‘too	 big	 to	 bail.’
12	









matter	of	 the	compatibility	of	 financial	 assistance	with	 the	 ‘no	bail-out	 clause’	was	 raised	




11	M.	Blyth,	Austerity-	the	history	of	a	dangerous	idea	 (2013),	 at	81.	 See	also,	more	 formally,	V.	
Acharya	and	S.	Steffen,	‘The	“greatest”	carry	trade	ever?	Understanding	Eurozone	bank	risks’,	J	
of	Financial	Economics	 (2015)	 115:	 215-236.	 The	 plot	 thickens	when	 one	 factors	 in	 the	 repo	
market,	or	the	way	banks	use	sovereign	debt	as	collateral	in	borrowing	cash.	See	D.	Gabor	and	C.	







See	 ECB,	The	 fiscal	 impact	of	 financial	 sector	 support	during	 the	crisis,	 ECB	 Economic	 Bulletin,	
Issue	6/2015.	https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eb201506_article02.en.pdf.		This	is	a	
common	pattern	in	history.	Even	without	large	scale	bailouts,	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	estimate	that	
government	 debts	 ‘typically’	 rise	 about	 86%	 in	 the	 three	 years	 following	 a	 systemic	 financial	
crisis,	largely	owing	to	collapsing	revenues.	C.	Reinhart	and	K.	Rogoff,	‘From	Financial	Crash	to	
Debt	Crisis’,	American	Economic	Rev	(2011)	101	(5):	1676-1706.	
14	See	 generally	 for	 example	 T.	 Beukers	 and	 B.	 de	 Witte,	 ‘The	 Court	 of	 Justice	 approves	 the	
creation	 of	 the	 European	 Stability	 Mechanism	 outside	 the	 EU	 legal	 order:	 Pringle’,	 Common	
Market	 Law	 Rev	 (2013)	 50:	 805-848,	 P.	 Craig,	 ‘Pringle:	 Legal	 Reasoning,	 Text,	 Purpose	 and	
122	and	123	TFEU	that	the	purpose	of	Article	125	TFEU	cannot	be	to	prohibit	all	 financial	
assistance	 by	 one	 Member	 State	 to	 another.
15
	To	 divine	 the	 precise	 meaning	 of	 the	
prohibition,	 then,	 the	 Court	 decided	 to	 look	 at	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 provision,	 which	 it	
formulated	as	follows:	
The	 prohibition	 laid	 down	 in	 Article	125	 TFEU	 ensures	 that	 the	 Member	 States	
remain	subject	to	the	logic	of	the	market	when	they	enter	into	debt,	since	that	ought	
to	 prompt	 them	 to	maintain	 budgetary	 discipline.	 Compliance	with	 such	 discipline	










are	 perfectly	 compatible	 with	 Article	 125	 TFEU	 as	 long	 as	 the	 beneficiary	Member	 State	






sovereign	bond	markets	 is	 fairly	straightforward:	unless	default	 is	a	credible	prospect,	 the	
risk	of	default	 is	never	 to	going	 to	be	priced	properly,	and	 the	market	will	not	be	able	 to	
provide	 the	 correct	 incentives	 to	 indebted	 States.	 In	 other	 words,	 for	 the	 ‘logic	 of	 the	
market’	 to	exert	 its	magic,	 it	 is	vital	 that	creditors	 live	 in	 fear	of	 losing	their	money,
	19	
and	
																														 																														 																														 																														 																														 																														 									
Teleology’,	Maastricht	J	of	European	and	Comparative	L	(2013)	20:	3-11,	and	G.	Beck,	‘The	Court	






19	See	Q.	 Peel	 and	R.	Atkins,	 ‘Financial	Markets	 “do	not	 understand	 the	 euro”’,	 Interview	with	
Wolfgang	 Schäuble,	 Financial	 Times,	 6	 December	 2010	 (‘Mr.	 Schäuble	 warned	 that	 if	 private	
that	debtors	live	in	fear	of	full-blown	disaster.	If	we	take	the	Court	seriously,	then,	we	are	to	
believe	that	a	credible	threat	of	financial	instability	in	the	monetary	union	contributes	to	the	
‘higher	objective’	of	 financial	 stability	 in	 the	monetary	union.	 For	 the	compatibility	of	 the	
ESM	with	Article	125	TFEU,	the	disastrous	 implication	of	the	‘logic	of	the	market’	 is	that	a	
bail-out	is	only	lawful	if	everyone	behaves	as	if	there	were	no	bail-out.	That,	in	turn,	leads	to	
an	obligation	on	 the	ESM	to	be	as	 ineffective	as	possible,	and	 to	 inflict	as	much	pain	and	
misery	on	the	populations	of	debtor	states	as	feasible.		
The	distributional	 consequences	of	 the	 requirement	 that	any	 financial	 assistance	may	not	
intervene	in	the	relationship	between	the	debtor	state	and	its	creditors	are	clear	enough:	by	











State.	 There	 remains	 however	 for	 the	 potential	 creditors	 of	 a	 Member	 State	 an	
additional	uncertainty	as	to	whether	possible	financial	assistance	to	a	Member	State	
may	actually	lead	to	the	satisfaction	of	their	demands.	To	that	extent,	the	voluntary	
support	 of	 a	 Member	 State	 need	 not	 inevitably	 be	 accompanied	 by	 either	 a	
complete	 or	 even	 partial	 satisfaction	 of	 the	 Member	 State’s	 creditors.	 That	




																														 																														 																														 																														 																														 																														 									






primary	markets,	 the	 requirement	poses	no	problem:	here,	 the	beneficiary	Member	State	











on	 that	market	 of	 bonds	 issued	by	 an	 ESM	Member	 pays	 a	 price	 to	 the	holder	 of	
those	bonds,	who	is	the	creditor	of	the	issuing	ESM	Member,	does	not	mean	that	the	
ESM	becomes	responsible	 for	 the	debt	of	 that	ESM	Member	 to	 that	creditor.	That	









to	 the	 creditor,	 in	 my	 opinion	 the	 prohibition	 on	 directly	 benefiting	 creditors	






capacity	 of	 another	 Member	 State.	 When	 an	 ordinary	 purchase	 is	 made	 on	 the	




It	 is	 not	 evident	 that	 the	 deployment	 of	 financial	 assistance	 instruments	 under	
Article	18	 of	 the	 ESM	 Treaty	 would	 necessarily	 deviate	 from	 the	 circumstances	





















benefit	 would	 be	 to	 anyone	 for	 it	 to	 act	 the	 way	 the	 Court	 instructs	 it	 to	 conduct	 its	
business:	 a	 financial	 assistance	 program	 that	 is	 not	 allowed	 to	 make	 either	 creditors	 or	
debtors	better	off	is	not	likely	to	be	of	much	use	to	anyone.	The	very	purpose	of	purchasing	




as	Mario	Draghi	would	 show	 to	dramatic	effect	 in	 the	OMT	saga,	 this	 is	best	done	not	 in	
secret	but	by	waving	a	bazooka	around.				
	
If	 the	 ‘logic	 of	 the	 market’	 makes	 the	 ESM	 as	 ineffective	 as	 feasible,	 it	 also	 makes	 its	
assistance	as	painful	as	possible	on	the	recipient	state	and	its	population.	It	may	be	worth	
recalling	 how	 the	 Court	 gets	 from	 a	 ‘no	 bail-out	 clause’	 to	 a	 requirement	 of	 strict	
conditionality-	 and	 thereby	 freezes	 the	 enactment	 of	 austerity	 measures	 into	 a	 legal	
obligation	 for	 states	 in	 financial	 distress.	 On	 the	 Court’s	 construction,	 Article	 125	 TFEU	
doesn’t	 actually	 prohibit	 financial	 assistance,	 it	 exists	 only	 to	 preserve	 ‘the	 logic	 of	 the	
market’	 in	sovereign	debt.	Article	125	TFEU	doesn’t	actually	 impose	budget	discipline;	 the	
impetus	 to	 pursue	 sound	 policies	 is	 merely	 a	 contingent	 by-product	 of	 ‘the	 logic	 of	 the	
market.’	That	logic,	in	turn,	depends	on	price	formation	not	being	polluted	by	expectations	






The	 purpose	 of	 this	 exercise	 is	 not	 to	work	 out	 the	most	 sensible	
path	to	the	restoration	of	growth	and	financial	health	for	the	assisted	state	but	to	restore	
some	semblance	of	‘the	logic	of	the	market’	to	the	sovereign	debt	markets	of	other	Member	
States:	 if	 not	 by	 the	 discipline	 of	 unpolluted	markets	 themselves,	 States	 will	 have	 to	 be	
deterred	 from	 pursuing	 unsound	 budgetary	 policies	 by	 the	 prospect	 of	 having	 to	 live	
through	the	same	amount	of	pain	and	misery	 inflicted	on	states	assisted	by	the	ESM.	The	
measure	of	punishment	 inflicted,	 then,	 is	 not	 a	matter	of	market	 forces	but	of	 a	political	
decision	whose	 legality	 is	 bounded	 by	 theoretically	 contested	 and	 empirically	 unfounded	
assumptions	about	the	‘the	logic	of	the	market’	and	about	the	sacrifices	the	markets	would	







legal	 ossification	 of	 a	 violently	 disputed	 economic	 theory	 of	 market-disciplined	 structural	
	4. The	Market	in	Sovereign	Debt	in	Euroland,	Part	II	
	
After	 the	 collapse	 of	 Lehman	Brothers,	 sovereign	 debt	markets	 in	 the	 Eurozone	woke	 up	
from	their	slumber	and	 for	 the	 fateful	years	between	2008	and	2012	seemed	to	be	doing	














																														 																														 																														 																														 																														 																														 									
renewal	 at	 a	 time	 of	 radicalized	 protest	 against	 austerity	 at	 national	 level.’	 M.	 Everson,	 ‘A	
Technocracy	of	Governing:	Power	without	the	State;	Power	without	the	Market’,	in	C.	Joerges	&	
C.	 Glinski	 (eds.),	 The	 European	 Crisis	 and	 the	 Transformation	 of	 Transnational	 Governance	






(2009),	 47	 (5):	 1017-1039;	 I.	 Hardie	 and	 D.	 Howarth	 (eds.),	Market-Based	 Banking	 and	 the	








With	 the	 power	 of	 financial	 markets	 acutely	 felt,	 it	 became	 an	 article	 of	 faith	 that	
discrimination	between	member	States	was	a	good	 thing,	and	 that	 the	spread	was	a	vital	
mechanism	to	have	spendthrift	states	live	up	their	responsibility	and	engage	in	the	austerity	
policies	of	‘adjustment’	and	‘consolidation.’		The	Bundesbank	rejoiced:	‘market	discipline-	if	




	The	 moral,	 political	 and	 macroeconomic	 argument	 was	 won	 so	 decisively	 that	 the	 only	
space	for	viable	contestation	of	austerity	politics	seemed	to	become	econometrics.	Not	the	
power	 of	 financial	markets	 per	 se	 was	 questioned,	 but	 their	 wisdom:	what	 if	 they	 got	 it	
‘wrong’?		An	enormous	literature	spawned	fairly	soon	from	central	banks	and	think	tanks	on	
the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 markets	 were	 ‘right’,	 or	 more	 modestly,	 whether	 the	
‘correction’	 or	 ‘revaluation’	 could	 plausibly	 be	 explained	 by	 ‘market	 fundamentals’
28
	or	
rather	 at	 least	 partly	 also	 by	 panic	 and	 fear.
29




	Dominant	 theory	 for	quite	 some	 time	held	on	 to	 the	central	
																														 																														 	
27	Deutsche	Bundesbank,	Monthly	Report,	June	2011,	at	44.	Emphasis	added.	
28	The	 econometric	 models	 are	 complex,	 largely	 because	 of	 the	 need	 to	 avoid	 the	 almost	
inevitable	endogeneity	of	nearly	every	conceivable	set	of	correlating	variables.	See	for	example	
M.-G.	 Attinasi,	 C.	 Checherita	 and	 Ch.	 Nickel,	 ‘What	 explains	 the	 surge	 in	 Euro	 area	 sovereign	
spreads	during	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-2009?’,	(2009)	ECB	Working	Papers	1131;	S.	Barrios,	
P.	 Iversen,	M.	Lewandowska	and	R.	Setzer,	 ‘Determinants	of	 intra-euro	area	government	bond	
spreads	 during	 the	 financial	 crisis’,	 (2009)	 European	 Commission	 Economic	 Papers	 388;	 M.	
Arghyrou	and	A.	Kontonikas,	 ‘The	EMU	sovereign-debt	crisis:	Fundamentals,	expectations	and	
contagion’,	J	of	International	Financial	Markets,	Institutions	and	Money	(2012)	22	(4):	658-677;	J.	
Beirne	 and	M.	 Fratzscher,	 ‘The	 pricing	 of	 sovereign	 risk	 and	 contagion	 during	 the	 European	
sovereign	 debt	 crisis’,	 (2013)	 ECB	 Working	 Papers	 1625,	 and	 C.	 Chiarella	 et	 al.,	 ‘Fear	 of	
Fundamentals?	 Heterogenous	 beliefs	 in	 the	 European	 sovereign	 CDS	 market’,	 J	 of	 Empirical	
Finance	(2015)	32:	19-34.	
29	A	 thesis	brought	 to	prominence	by	Paul	de	Grauwe.	See	 for	example	P.	de	Grauwe	and	Y.	 Ji,	
‘Self-fulfilling	Crises	 in	 the	Eurozone:	An	Empirical	Test’,	 J	of	 International	Money	and	Finance	
(2013)	34:	15-36.	
30 	C.	 Favero	 and	 A.	 Missale,	 ‘Sovereign	 spreads	 in	 the	 eurozone:	 which	 prospects	 for	 a	
Eurobond?’,	Economic	Policy	(2012)	27:	231-273,	at	267.	
role	 of	 country-specific	 weak	 fundamentals,	 	 and	 of	 increased	 skepticism	 of	 peripheral	
states’	solvency-	rather	than	contagious	fears	of	a	contagious	break-up	of	the	Eurozone.	The	







could	 be	 a	 type	 of	 threshold	 value	with	 regard	 to	 fundamentals	 such	 as	 the	 debt	




The	 debate	 settled	 when	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank	 espoused	 the	 theory	 of	 a	 ‘bad	
equilibrium’-	 ‘namely	 an	 equilibrium	where	 you	 have	 self-fulfilling	 expectations	 that	 feed	








	Yet,	 spreads	 remained	 decidedly	 higher	 than	 they	 had	 been	 before	 the	
crisis,	 leading	 to	 contentment	 in	 Frankfurt.	 In	 2014,	 the	 Bundesbank	 reiterated	 its	








33 	ECB,	 Introductory	 statement	 to	 the	 press	 conference	 (with	 Q&A),	 6	 September	 2012.	
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html	
34	See	 for	 example	 P.	 de	 Grauwe	 and	 Y.	 Ji,	 ‘Disappearing	 government	 bond	 spreads	 in	 the	
Eurozone:	Back	to	normal?’,	CEPS	Working	Document	396	(2014),	and	M.	Chang	and	P.	Leblond,	












Euro,	 the	 idea	was	 driven	 by	worries	 about	market	 fragmentation	 and	 lack	 of	 liquidity.
37
	
Latter	 day	 iterations,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 bend	 over	 backwards	 to	 devise	 schemes,	
mechanisms	and	institutional	arrangements	to	square	the	circle	of	mutualized	debt,	market	
discipline	 and	 individual	 responsibility.
38
	The	 Commission’s	 own	 short-lived	 proposal	 of	
‘Stability	bonds’	is	a	good	example	of	this.		The	proposal	admits	to	‘possibly	some	degree	of	












37	Co-ordinated	 Public	 Debt	 Issuance	 in	 the	 Eurp	 Area-	 Report	 of	 the	 Giovannini	 Group,	 8	
November	 2000.	 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication6372_en.pdf.	
The	 Giovannini	 report,	 remarkably	 for	 post-crisis	 sensitivities,	 does	 not	 once	 mention	 the	
concepts	of	‘moral	hazard’	or	even	‘market	discipline.’	
38	See	 for	 example	 J.	 Muellbauer,	 ‘Conditional	 Eurobonds	 and	 the	 Eurozone	 sovereign	 debt	
crisis’,	 Oxford	 Rev	 of	 Economic	 Policy	 (2013)	 29:	 610-645;	 A.	 Hild,	 B.	 Herz	 and	 C.	 Bauer,	
‘Structured	Eurobonds:	Limiting	Liability	and	Distributing	Profits’,	 J	of	Common	Market	Studies	
(2014)	 52:	 250-267,	 and	 R.	 Beetsma	 and	 K.	 Mavromatis,	 ‘An	 analysis	 of	 eurobonds’,	 J	 of	
International	Money	and	Finance	(2014)	45:	91-111.		









theory	 behind	 austerity	 policies.
41
	Periphery	 countries	 are	 caught	 in	 a	 spiral	 of	 fiscal	
contraction,	lower	growth,	higher	debt,	higher	borrowing	costs,	more	fiscal	contraction,	and	
so	 on.	 This	may	 seem	 perfectly	 intuitive,	 but	 it	 was	 not	 supposed	 to	 be	 like	 this.	 Ecofin	
ministers,	 the	 European	 Commission,	 and	 the	 ECB	 have	 all	 been	 under	 the	 spell	 of	 the	
theory	of	 ‘expansionary	 fiscal	consolidation’	according	to	which	serious	spending	cuts	and	
deep	 structural	 reform	may	 lead	 to	 short-term	 contractions,	 but	 will,	 after	 a	 year	 or	 so,	
actually	 return	 indebted	 countries	 to	 sustained	 growth.
42
	The	 blatant	 failure	 of	 austerity	










swayed	 the	 powers	 that	 be,	 see	M.	Blyth,	 Austerity-	 The	History	 of	 a	Dangerous	 Idea	 (2013),	
169-177;	 S.	 Dellepiane-Avellaneda,	 ‘The	 Political	 Power	 of	 Economic	 Ideas:	 The	 Case	 of	
“Expansionary	Fiscal	Contractions”’,	British	J	of	Politics	and	International	Relations	 (2015),	 17:	
319-418,	 and	 O.	 Helgadóttir,	 ‘The	 Bocconi	 boys	 go	 to	 Brussels:	 Italian	 economic	 ideas,	
professional	networks	and	European	austerity’,	J	of	European	Public	Policy	(2016),	32:	392-409.	
Incredibly,	the	European	Commission	is	still	a	fan.	See	European	Commission,	Report	on	Public	
Finances	 in	 EMU	 2014	 (rehearsing	 episodes	 of	 successful	 consolidations,	 concluding	 that	
revenue-based	consolidations	do	not	work	nearly	as	well	as	expenditure-based	consolidations,	
and	 recommending,	 on	p	 134,	 that	 ‘cuts	 should	 concentrate	 on	 the	more	 rigid	 and	persistent	













With	 the	 OMT	 program,	 the	 ECB	 signaled	 its	 readiness	 to	 buy	 up	 massive	 quantities	 of	
government	bonds	of	periphery	countries	 from	secondary	markets.	Not	unreasonably,	 the	






as	an	 instrument	of	 ‘monetary’,	 rather	 than	 ‘economic’	policy.	Since	 the	Court	had	stated	
																														 																														 	
43	See	O.	Blanchard	and	D.	Leigh,	‘Growth	Forecasts	and	Fiscal	Multipliers’,	(2013)	IMF	Working	
Paper	 13/1.	On	 the	 development	 of	 policy	 in	 the	 IMF,	 see	 C.	 Ban,	 ‘Austerity	 versus	 Stimulus?	
Understanding	 Fiscal	 Policy	 Change	 at	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 since	 the	 Great	
Recession’,	Governance	(2014)	28	(2):	167-183.	
44	See	 for	 example	 European	 Commission,	 Report	 on	 Public	 Finances	 in	 EMU	 2012,	 115;	 J.	
Boussard,	 F.	 de	Castro	 and	M.	 Salto,	 ‘Fiscal	Multipliers	 and	Debt	Dynamics	 in	Consolidations’,	
European	Commission	Economic	Papers	460/	2012;	K.	Berti,	F.	de	Castro	and	M.	Salto,	‘Effects	of	
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categorically	 in	 Pringle	 that	 ‘financial	 assistance	 to	 a	 member	 State	 clearly	 does	 not	 fall	
within	monetary	policy’,
46
	the	 imperative	was	 to	cast	 the	ECB’s	 intervention-	which	rather	
obviously	 had	 as	 its	 immediate	 objective	 to	 lower	 spreads	 and	 rates	 and	 so	 to	 lower	
refinancing	costs	for	indebted	Member	States-	as	something	other	than	‘assistance.’		





that	 transmission	mechanism	 in	 case	 it	 is	 disrupted.
47
	The	 Court	 also	 accepted	 the	 ECB’s	
analysis	 that	 the	economic	 situation	 in	 the	euro	area	was	 characterized	by	 ‘high	volatility	
and	 extreme	 spreads’,	 spreads	 that	 ‘were	 not	 accounted	 for	 solely	 by	 macroeconomic	
differences	 between	 the	 States	 concerned	 but	 were	 caused,	 in	 part,	 by	 the	 demand	 for	
excessive	 risk	 premia	 for	 the	 bonds	 issued	 by	 certain	Member	 States,	 such	 premia	 being	
intended	 to	 guard	 against	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 break-up	 of	 the	 euro	 area.’
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in	 that	 State,	 in	 the	 value	 of	 the	 portfolios	 of	 financial	 institutions	 holding	 such	
bonds	 and	 the	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 such	 institutions	 to	 obtain	 liquidity.	 Therefore,	
eliminating	 or	 reducing	 the	 excessive	 risk	 premia	 demanded	 of	 the	 government	
bonds	of	a	member	State	 is	 likely	 to	avoid	 the	volatility	and	 level	of	 those	premia	
from	 hindering	 the	 transmission	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 ESCB’s	 monetary	 policy	









This	 is	 not	 the	 kind	 of	 economic	 engineering	 that	 finds	 much	 favor	 in	 Frankfurt	 and	
Karlsruhe.	Probably	 the	most	significant	argument	against	 the	ECB’s	 theory	 is	 the	one	the	
Court	of	Justice	completely	ignores.	As	the	German	constitutional	court	points	out,	it	is	hard	
to	conceive	of	any	debt	crisis	where	 the	 ‘monetary	policy	 transmission	mechanism’	 is	not	
disrupted:		
A	 critical	 deterioration	 of	 the	 solvency	 of	 a	 state	 typically	 coincides	 with	 a	
corresponding	deterioration	of	the	solvency	of	the	national	banking	sector	(so-called	
bank-state	 nexus).	 As	 a	 result,	 in	 this	 situation,	 the	 lending	 practices	 of	 the	 banks	
tend	to	hardly	reflect	the	reductions	in	the	key	interest	rate	anymore;	the	monetary	
policy	transmission	mechanism	is	disrupted.	If	purchases	of	government	bonds	were	
admissible	every	 time	the	monetary	policy	 transmission	mechanism	 is	disrupted,	 it	





Even	 if	 the	argument	here	seems	unaffected	by	 the	question	of	 the	 rationality	of	 spreads	
and	rates,	the	more	visible	and	notorious	disagreement	between	the	two	Courts	consisted	
largely	 of	 a	 rehearsal	 of	 the	 econometric	 debate	 about	 the	 role	 of	 ‘fundamentals’	 in	 the	
spreads.	 The	 Bundesverfassungsgericht	 had	 no	 trouble	 working	 this	 seamlessly	 into	 an	
argument	 about	 the	 role	 of	 ‘market	 discipline’	 in	 the	 incentive	 structure	 of	 EMU,	 and	
throwing	Pringle	back	in	the	face	of	the	Court	of	Justice:		
According	 to	 the	European	Central	Bank,	 these	 spreads	are	partly	based	on	 fear	 –	
declared	 to	 be	 irrational	 –	 of	 investors	 of	 a	 reversibility	 of	 the	 euro.	 However,	
according	to	the	convincing	expertise	of	the	Bundesbank,	such	interest	rate	spreads	
only	reflect	the	skepticism	of	market	participants	that	individual	Member	States	will	
show	 sufficient	 budgetary	 discipline	 to	 stay	 permanently	 solvent.	 Pursuant	 to	 the	
design	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union,	the	existence	of	such	
spreads	 is	 entirely	 intended.	 As	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 has	








The	 Bunderverfassungsgericht	 surely	 opens	 itself	 up	 to	 justified	 criticism	 embracing	 an	




		 But	 this	 criticism	 ignores	 the	 way	 the	 constitutional	 court	 later	 on	
develops	a	stance	separate	from	the	‘convincing	expertise’	of	the	Bundesbank	that	is	rather	
more	interesting.	Where	the	court	first	references	‘explanations’	given	by	the	Bundesbank	





Spreads	 always	 only	 result	 from	 the	 market	 participants’	 expectations	 and	 are,	
regardless	of	 their	 rationality,	essential	 for	market-based	pricing.	To	single	out	and	




The	 Bundesverfassungsgericht,	 in	 other	 words,	 has	 no	 difficulty	 at	 all	 in	 conceiving	 of	
markets	 as	 social	 and	 political	 institutions	 consisting	 of	 operators	 and	 participants	 with	
hopes,	fears	and	interests.	It	may	be	‘market	fundamentalist’,	but	its	faith	and	loyalty	is	to	
markets	 as	 they	 actually	 behave.	 What	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 does	 is	 altogether	 more	
insidious:	 this	 is	market	 fundamentalism	 loyal	not	 to	actual	market	behavior,	but	 to	some	












the	concept	of	 ‘right’	and	 ‘proper’	 interest	rates	that	can	be	discerned	and	engineered	by	
technicians.	This	is	not	just	an	academic	exercise:	this	elusive	equilibrium	is	the	dividing	line	
between	 admissible	 monetary	 policy	 and	 prohibited	 economic	 policy,	 and	 the	 exact	
measure	of	how	much	austerity	is	legally	required	of	debtor	states.			
When	the	ESM	buys	up	bonds	on	secondary	markets,	it	is	‘economic	policy.’	When	the	ECB	
does	 the	 same,	 and	 makes	 these	 purchases	 conditional	 on	 compliance	 with	 the	 ESM’s	
‘macroeconomic	 adjustment’	 demands,	 it	 is	 ‘monetary	 policy.’	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 Court	
holds,	 it	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 respective	 operations	 which	 is	
decisive.
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	By	 accepting	 the	 ECB’s	 objective	 of	 ‘repairing’	 a	 ‘disrupted’	 monetary	 policy	
transmission	mechanism,	and	by	demanding	 that	OMT	cease	 ‘as	 soon	as	 these	objectives	
have	 been	 achieved’,
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certainty	 that	 the	ESCB	will	at	a	 future	point	purchase	 their	government	bonds	on	
secondary	markets	and	(ii)	that	the	programme	in	question	cannot	be	implemented	
in	a	way	which	would	bring	about	a	harmonization	of	 the	 interest	 rates	applied	 to	
the	 government	 bonds	 of	 the	 Member	 States	 of	 the	 euro	 area	 regardless	 of	 the	
differences	arising	from	their	macroeconomic	or	budgetary	situation.	



















which	 has	 as	 its	 objective	 to	 return	 irrational	markets	 to	 the	 ‘logic	 of	 the	market’-	 takes	
place	according	 to	 the	 ‘logic	of	 the	market.’	And	that	means-	as	 it	did	 in	Pringle-	 that	 the	





































	The	 only	 Eurozone	 country	 excluded	 from	 the	 extravaganza	 is	 Greece,	whose	
‘credit	quality’	doesn’t	meet	the	Bank’s	exacting	standards.	It	is	inherent	in	‘the	logic	of	the	
market’	that	credit	is	readily	available	and	cheap	for	those	who	don’t	really	need	it,	that	it	
gets	more	 expensive	 the	more	 you	 need	 it,	 and	 that	 it	 slides	 out	 of	 reach	 altogether	 for	




and	 cynical	 politics	 masquerading	 as	 inept	 economics.	 To	 freeze	 political	 substitutes	 for	
market	 discipline	 (ESM)	 and	 technocratic	 truth-seeking	 about	 the	 ‘correct’	 price	 of	 debt	
(OMT)	into	law	as	the	standard	of	permissible	assistance	and	as	the	measure	of	austerity	is	
rather	worse	than	just	bad	law.	This	is	how	we	live	in	Euroland.		
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